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Proposed Restrictions on Deductibility*
By BORIS I. BITTKER
THE SEVENTH MORTIMER H. HESS MEMORIAL LECTURE
I want this evening to discuss with you an important proposed
amendment to the federal estate tax law, under which the deduc-
tion allowed for charitable bequests-now unlimited in amount
-would be limited to a specified percentage of the testator's es-
tate. The most frequently mentioned figure is 5o per cent. Similar
proposals to emulate the income tax by imposing a percentage
limit on the deduction of charitable contributions have been
floated from time to time for at least 35 years,' but recently these
trial balloons have attracted more attention on Capitol Hill than
ever before.2 By itself, the issue is a narrow one, affecting only a
small fraction of estates; but I propose to show that it raises fun-
damental issues about the nature and objectives of death taxation
and that, on analysis, the proposal for a percentage limitation
turns out to rest on a faulty foundation. This analysis also exposes
parallel shortcomings in the rationale underlying several other
proposed changes, such as converting the deduction into a tax
credit or substituting a system of matching federal grants to chari-
table institutions.3
I. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE DEDUCTION
First, a brief historical narrative.
When Congress turned to death taxes as a source of federal
revenue in 1916 (as it had in 1797 when war with France seemed
possible and again in 1862 and 18984), it granted no exemption
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for bequests to charity. The legislative history of the 1916 law is
meager, and we are left to speculate about the reason for the fail-
ure to grant charities an exemption that was almost universal at
the time in state inheritance laws. 5 Perhaps the explanation may
be found in the difference in theory between the typical state in-
heritance tax and the much less common estate tax that Congress
chose to enact in 1916.6 The legal structure of an inheritance tax
focuses on the decedent's beneficiaries, who are customarily
grouped into several categories, depending on the closeness of
their relationship to the decedent. Bequests to the most favored
group (the widow or widower and children) ordinarily qualify
for generous exemptions and relatively modest rates, while be-
quests to more distant relatives and "strangers" get less generous
exemptions and are subjected to higher rates. Since it directly
reduces the amount received by the heir or legatee, an inheritance
tax on charitable bequests is readily perceived as a burden on the
charitable institution and its beneficiaries; and this perception,
in turn, virtually invites a legislative exemption of such bequests
lest the institution's charitable functions be curtailed.
By contrast with typical state inheritance taxes, the 1916 death
tax imposed by Congress looked to the aggregate estate left by the
decedent, rather than to the separate amounts passing to the heirs
and legatees. This legislative decision to enact an estate tax con-
tributed to simplicity, by avoiding the necessity of classifying re-
cipients into a number of categories; and this in turn sidestepped
the valuation problems created by testamentary trusts whose ulti-
mate recipients are not known at the date of death and may even-
tually fall into any of several categories, depending on the way
the trustee subsequently exercises discretionary powers or other
postmortem events.7 But the very fact that the federal estate tax
would be the same whether the estate went to the decedent's chil-
dren, collateral relatives, or friends, as well as the fact that the
identity of the recipients might not be known for many years,
tended to divert attention away from these persons, as though
the burden of the tax fell not on them, but on the decedent.
The status of charitable bequests, therefore, may have been over-
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looked by the draftsmen of the 1916 law in their preoccupation
with the size of the estate as such; or they may have viewed an
exemption for bequests to charitable legatees as inconsistent with
the basic concept of a tax on the estate as a whole.
Whatever the reason for failing to exempt charitable bequests
in 1916, this omission was quickly remedied. In 1918 Congress
enacted a deduction for charitable bequests8 that has remained
substantially intact to this day. According to Dean Griswold, this
change in the law occurred "almost by accident." 9 (Dean Gris-
wold's characterization was probably not intended as praise,
though no doubt some disenchanted observers of Capitol Hill
might argue that legislation by accident is sometimes better than
legislation by plan.) In point of fact, however, the deduction may
owe its origin to something more rational than accident.
As passed by the House of Representatives, the Revenue Act of
1918 reenacted the 1916 estate tax with substantial amendments,
including a more steeply graduated rate schedule, but the Senate,
following the recommendation of the Senate Finance Committee,
substituted an inheritance tax.10 As the Senate committee pointed
out, under the 1916 federal estate tax, a person receiving a be-
quest of a given amount from a large estate bore a heavier burden
than a person receiving a bequest of the same amount from a
smaller estate; by shifting to an inheritance tax based on the size
of the individual share, Congress could equalize their burdens
and thus achieve, in the committee's opinion, a "fairer and more
equitable" result." The Senate substitute included an exemption
for charitable bequests, seemingly patterned on the exemption in
typical state inheritance tax laws. When the bill went to confer-
ence to resolve this head-on collision between the House's estate
tax and the Senate's inheritance tax, the conferees recommended
retention of the 1916 estate tax structure but with higher rates,
an exemption for charitable bequests, and a few other changes. 12
This bit of legislative history suggests that when the congres-
sional committees focussed on the status of the beneficiary, who
after all must bear the burden of any death tax-the decedent be-
ing henceforth concerned with less mundane matters-they may
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have concluded that equity was better served by exempting,
rather than taxing, amounts destined for charitable uses. If the
beneficiaries of a charitable bequest are persons on the lower
rungs of the income ladder, their meager ability to pay strongly
suggests that an exemption is preferable to a tax on their share of
the estate. 13 Even if the beneficiaries of the bequest are not in-
digents, but members of the general public, as would be true if
the bequest is to a college, museum, or similar institution, their
average economic status is almost certainly lower than that of
typical recipients of federally-taxed bequests. For this reason, an
exemption of charitable bequests that inure to the benefit of run-
of-the-mine citizens is, in my view, completely harmonious with
the spirit of the federal estate law.
We cannot know for sure whether these considerations were
present in the minds of the legislators when they added the de-
duction for charitable bequests to the Revenue Act of 1918. The
record does establish that the Senate Finance Committee recog-
nized the "ability to pay" issue indirectly, when it noted the un-
fairness of taxing two bequests of the same amount at different
rates simply because one came from a larger estate than the other.
(The point of this criticism was that in judging the fairness of
death taxation, we should look at the living person who gets the
bequest, not at the dead person who left the property.) It seems
entirely possible that the conferees were unwilling to correct this
undesirable aspect of the 1916 estate law by shifting to an in-
heritance tax for any of a number of reasons-the simplicity of
an estate tax, a potential loss of revenue during wartime, the fact
that wills may have been drafted and estates planned on the as-
sumption that the 1916 law would remain on the books, etc.-but
that they accepted the inheritance tax approach in the limited
area of charitable bequests because the injustice of taxing these
transfers was especially apparent.
Whatever the reason, the deduction was enacted as part of
the Revenue Act of 1918_14 and has been retained by Congress
throughout the ensuing years with remarkably few changes. In-
deed, if a member of the Congress that enacted the Revenue Act
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of 1 918 were to peruse today's Internal Revenue Code-a harsh in-
terruption, to be sure, of his eternal rest-he would find few pro-
visions that preserved his work as faithfully as §2055. There have
been, in fact, only two changes of consequence, both designed to
limit or deny the deduction if the bequest may be diverted from
the purported charitable beneficiary. 15
II. THE PERCENTAGE LIMIT ON THE INCOME TAX
DEDUCTION FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
From the outset, the deduction has been unlimited, in the
sense that a charitable bequest, no matter how large, qualifies for
deduction, so that no federal estate tax is payable if the entire
estate is left to charity. Section 2055's income tax counterpart,
however, was restricted to 15 percent of the taxpayer's income
when it was enacted in 1916; this ceiling has been repeatedly
raised and now stands at 50 per cent of adjusted gross income. 16
Although Congress eliminated the ceiling in 1924 for taxpayers
donating substantially all of their after-tax income to charitable
purposes (a tiny group), in 1969 this exception was repealed, sub-
ject to a transitional period of gradual phase-out.'7 Thus, the per-
centage limit has been a basic feature of the income tax since the
inception of the deduction in 1916.
The contrast between the limited income tax deduction and
the unlimited deduction allowed for federal estate tax purposes
has not gone unnoticed. As long ago as 1940, in his casebook on
federal taxation, Dean Griswold asked:
Would a maximum limit on the amount of charitable gifts
allowed as deductions [for federal estate tax purposes] be
desirable? Cf. section 23(0) of the income tax.' 8
I find that in the 6th edition of his casebook, published in 1966,
Dean Griswold asked exactly the same question, and continued
to refrain from supplying an answer.19 I mean no criticism; as a
teacher, I can testify that when a question succeeds in stimulating
class discussion, it should be preserved with care, and protected
against erosion by those who want to see their answers in print.
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Nothing casts a pall on a classroom like a student who has read
the teacher's law journal article on a subject of discussion and
then proceeds to regurgitate it.
One of Dean Griswold's colleagues, however, has addressed
himself to the question (though not, to be sure, until after the
Dean's departure from academic life). In his 1971 Hess lecture
before this Association, Professor Westfall suggested "that we may
no longer be able to afford the luxury of an unlimited chari-
table deduction for estate tax purposes," and he recently fleshed
out this comment by recommending that the deduction be limited
to 5o per cent of the estate.20 As I have already suggested, I dis-
agree with this proposal.
The best point of entry into the issue before us is the income
tax's percentage limit on the deductibility of charitable gifts,
since this is sometimes held up as a model, the absence of such a
limit from the federal estate tax being viewed as an anomoly that
calls for legislative correction. Why does the income tax contain
a percentage limit on the deduction of charitable gifts and are
.these reasons equally applicable to the federal estate tax? Unfor-
• tunately, the Congressional committees did not announce their
.reasons for recommending enactment of the percentage restric-
tion in 1916, nor has this lacuna been filled in the subsequent
years, despite the repeated amendments that have expanded §170
from two brief sentences in the Revenue Act of 1916 to 14 pages
of turgid prose in its 1975 counterpart. Moreover, the percentage
limitation has not evoked any significant body of speculation or
discussion from tax theorists and commentators.
The simplest explanation for the restriction, that it was en-
acted to prevent a loss of revenue, is not persuasive. The number
of persons who give as much as the deductible limit, or who even
exceed the biblical tithe, is small; if Congress was ever seriously
concerned about a potential drain on the Treasury from an un-
limited deduction, that fear should have been allayed long ago
by the statistics.21
Perhaps the restriction stems, at least in part, from a feeling
that taxpayers get satisfactions from their charitable contributions
that resemble the pleasures derived from hobbies, vacations, cul-
HeinOnline -- 31 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 164 1976
HESS LECTURE
tural activities, and other personal uses to which they may put
their income. In exercising his command over income by making
a charitable gift, the taxpayer is sometimes said to get a kind of
"psychic income" in the form of personal pleasure and public
fame that should not be disregarded in determining his tax liabil-
ity, even though it cannot be given a precise dollar value. Critics
of existing law, indeed, sometimes argue that charitable gifts
are simply a form of personal consumption that is no more en-
titled to a deduction than ordinary expenditures for the cost of
hobbies and other personal activities. 22 Other tax theorists are not
prepared to go this far, however, because they perceive a "selfless"
element in charitable gifts distinguishing them from expendi-
tures for hobbies and other personal activities. But if they also
perceive an element of psychic income in charitable gifts, they
may wish the tax law to reflect both of these perceptions.
As a device to take simultaneous account of the selfless element
and the psychic income in charitable gifts, however, the percen-
tage limit is a crude instrument. Up to the amount of the limit,
the selfless element gets full sway, since the deduction is not re-
duced by any psychic income; on the other hand, amounts above
the limit generate no deduction for the donor's generous im-
pulses, implying that they are totally eclipsed by his psychic in-
come. A remedy that would be more suited to the foregoing
analysis of the psychological foundations of charitable gifts would
be a deduction limited to a specified percentage of each donated
dollar.
Another argument that is sometimes offered in support of the
income tax's percentage limitation is that in its absence, taxpay-
ers would be able to avoid paying any income tax, no matter how
great their income, if they were prepared to donate the entire
amount to charity. Since these taxpayers would continue as citi-
zens to enjoy the benefits of the federal government's programs-
and not necessarily as ascetics, since they might maintain an ex-
pensive standard of living by dipping into capital or using tax-
sheltered receipts23-this freedom from tax liability, it may be
argued, is objectionable.
In 1969, this was the rationale offered by the Senate Finance
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Committee when it recommended repeal of the unlimited chari-
table deduction that had entered the income tax law in 1924:
The committee does not believe that high-income taxpay-
ers should be allowed to significantly minimize or com-
pletely avoid tax liability by means of the charitable con-
tribution deduction. Accordingly, the committee agrees
with the House that the unlimited charitable contribution
... should be repealed. The effect of this.., is that charity
can remain an equal partner with respect to an individ-
ual's income, but the charitable contributions deduction
no longer will be allowed to reduce an individual's ad-
justed gross income by more than one-half.24
These reasons for limiting the deduction for charitable con-
tributions in computing income tax liability-the "psychic in-
come" derived by the donor from such contributions and his
continued enjoyment of the benefits of government-are not en-
tirely persuasive. "Psychic income" comes from many sources,
but for sound reasons, Congress has never sought to tax it; if emo-
tional satisfaction from one's activities generated taxable income,
people like Ralph Nader, William Buckley, Kenneth Galbraith,
and Ronald Reagan might have to pay more than John Paul
Getty, who seldom looks-at least to this observer-as though he
enjoyed his wealth.
Finally, the principal other rationale for the percentage limit
(viz., the duty-to-support-the-government argument) presupposes
that the benefit of the tax deduction inures to the donor rather
than to the donee. But this premise, in turn, rests on still another
assumption, viz., that charitable bequests are unaffected by the
deduction. If this assumption is invalid, and charitable bequests
would be reduced if they were taxed, the unlimited deduction of
existing law inures pro tanto to the benefit of the charitable
donees rather than the donor. Seen in this light, the deduction
appears to relieve charitable institutions and their beneficiaries
of the cost of supporting the federal government. The wisdom
of this policy may be debated, but its impact is certainly alto-
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gether different from relieving the donor of the burden of sup-
porting governmental services.
III. SHOULD THE PERCENTAGE LIMIT BE EXTENDED
TO THE ESTATE TAX DEDUCTION?
Notwithstanding these misgivings about the percentage limita-
tion on the income tax deduction for charitable contributions,
I am prepared to accept it arguendo as an embodiment of wise
policy. Even on this assumption, I see no case for extending it to
the federal estate tax. So far as psychic income from charitable
bequests is concerned, the decedent has left us, and this being a
secular society by virtue of the First Amendment, we should not
base our legislation on the assumption that he will enjoy the psy-
chic income of a happier hereafter because of his charitable be-
quests. It is occasionally suggested that death taxes should be
viewed as the final installment on a debt to society that was not
fully discharged by the payment of taxes during life, but this
rationale collides with the fact that nothing will be due if the
taxpayer spends all he has before death. What kind of a final
reckoning is it that can be so easily evaded and that falls only on
those who refrain from such extravagance?
Sense can be made of the federal estate tax, in my opinion, only
if we disabuse ourselves of the primitive notion that the decedent
"pays" the tax. The decedent, I make bold to suggest, leaves this
world with nothing, whether the tax is high or low; it is the living
persons whom he leaves behind who will enjoy the benefits of his
assets and bear the burden of the death tax. The tax, therefore,
should take account of their circumstances.
To be sure, the legislative decision to impose an estate tax sets
limits to the achievement of this objective. To avoid valuing
every potential beneficiary's interest in the estate, the federal tax
is imposed on the entire estate; the inevitable cost of this sim-
plicity in administration is that the rate of tax cannot be geared
to the separate financial situations of the individual legatees. In
effect, they are all taxed at an average rate-but it ought to bear a
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reasonable, even though rough, relationship to their ability to
pay.25
Many tax theorists favor changes in the death tax area that
would refine this relationship, by tailoring the tax more closely
to each legatee's personal circumstances. Thus, some favor taxing
gifts and bequests as income; others propose an accessions tax; and
there are still other ways to "individualize" the death tax.26 But
this can be done to some extent even within the constraints of a
conventional estate tax. The marital deduction is one such ele-
ment in the federal estate tax, based on the theory that amounts
inherited by a surviving spouse should not be taxed as heavily
as transfers to other persons. A similar theory underlies recent
proposals to exempt bequests to the decedent's minor children
or other dependents up to a specified amount (e.g., an exemption
for each child of $5,000 times the number of years remaining be-
fore attaining adulthood) .27
The deduction for charitable bequests has a similar function.
Far from being an anomoly in the federal estate tax structure, it
is, I submit, an appropriate-indeed admirable-device to tailor
the tax to the beneficiary's ability to pay. In recent years, only
about 9 per cent of decedents left estates large enough to require
filing a federal estate tax return,28 and almost a third of these
were nontaxable. 29 A rate structure designed for the children and
other legatees of this tiny upper crust of American society would
be grossly disproportionate if imposed on bequests to social wel-
fare organizations, educational institutions, and other charitable
groups, whose beneficiaries are drawn almost entirely from much
lower income levels. If the decedent leaves his country estate to
a charitable organization to be used as a summer camp for chil-
dren of the ghetto, should the transfer bear the same tax as a be-
quest of the same property to the decedent's children for their
personal use? Judged by their taxpaying capacities, these two
groups are as different as night and day. By permitting charitable
bequests to be deducted, existing law tacitly, but unmistakably,
acknowledges that there is a difference between the beneficiaries
of charitable bequests on the one hand, and the members of the
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decedent's family who receive the bulk of non-charitable be-
quests on the other. Only by disregarding the obvious can one
conclude that the deduction for charitable bequests is a tax loop-
hole, rather than a sensible way of adjusting the rate structure to
the realities of life.
When the death tax is viewed as a tax on the recipients of be-
quests rather than on their deceased benefactor, it becomes evi-
dent that the proposed percentage limitation on the charitable
contribution deduction would be similar to an income tax on
charitable institutions, based on the bequests they receive. The
income tax treatment of charitable organizations has been sub-
jected to much criticism in recent years, leading to numerous
legislative changes and even more proposals; but to the best of
my knowledge, no responsible commentator has ever recom-
mended that contributions should be taxed to the charitable re-
cipient. Yet this is exactly what would happen, albeit somewhat
indirectly, if the federal estate tax were amended to restrict the
deduction for charitable bequests.
In saying this, I am, of course, assuming that imposition of a
percentage limitation would in fact reduce the amount received
by charity. If the entire estate is left to charity, this assumption
is obviously valid, since only 1/2 would be deductible, and there
is no other source from which the tax on the balance could be
paid.30 If there are other bequests, the effect of a percentage limit
is slightly more problematical, but the result is, in my opinion,
likely to be similar. Assume, for example, that under existing
law a testator plans to leave 2o per cent of his estate to friends
or relatives, and the balance, after taxes, to a charity. Assume also
that under existing law this plan would result in transmitting 2o
per cent to the noncharitable legatees, 5 per cent to the govern-
ment as taxes, and 75 per cent to the charity. What changes would
the testator be likely to make if the law were changed so that the
charitable bequest could be deducted only in part-up to 50 per
cent of the estate? Assume that the hypothetical change in the law
would increase the federal estate tax from 5 per cent to 2o per
cent of the estate-an increase of 15 per cent. Would the testator
HeinOnline -- 31 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 169 1976
THE RECORD
be likely to cut back the noncharitable bequests by this amount,
giving the donees only 5 per cent of the estate rather than the 2o
per cent they were to get under the original plan? Or would he
be more likely to throw most or all of the entire burden on the
charity? The latter seems by far the more likely outcome.
Indeed, he might decide to cut back the charitable bequest by
more than the amount of the added tax. Under existing law, the
unlimited deduction is an inducement to make such bequests:
the charity gets more than the testator's other heirs lose. Under
the proposed change, however, there is no tax incentive to give
more to a charity than can be deducted; the tax result will be the
same whether the additional dollars are given to the charity or
to the testator's friends and relatives. For this reason, the testator
may well be impelled to cut the charity back to the deductible
5o per cent, leaving the balance after taxes to the noncharitable
heirs. If this is his reaction, an increase in the tax of 15 percentage
points would cause a reduction in the charitable bequest of 25
percentage points. The noncharitable heirs would then get 30
per cent of the estate, rather than the 2o per cent that they would
have received under the original estate plan.
If these views about the probable impact of the proposed per-
centage limit are correct, it is objectionable in two fundamental
respects: First, it would impose a burden that cannot be justified
on "ability to pay" principles. The federal estate tax, by virtue
of its $6o,ooo exemption, exclusion of most life insurance, and
exemption of survivors' benefits under the federal social security
system and qualified private pension plans, is a distinctly upper
class tax. We do not have any exact knowledge of the economic
status of the heirs of decedents leaving estates large enough to be
subject to the federal estate tax, but it has been estimated that
this tax is paid almost exclusively by families with annual in-
comes of over $2o,ooo.31 The proposed percentage limitation
would be felt almost entirely by the largest estates, where it is a
virtual certainty that the typical heirs are very high on the in-
come ladder. Taxing charitable bequests (by imposing a limit on
the deduction) will, therefore, apply an estate tax rate schedule
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designed for these wealthy taxpayers to charitable institutions
and their ultimate beneficiaries whose economic status is utterly
different. No matter how vague the "ability to pay" principle
may be, we surely know that there is a world of difference be-
tween the average heir to a multi-million dollar family fortune
and the run-of-the-mine middle and low income citizen who
benefits from bequests to universities, museums, community
funds, and other charitable institutions.
Second, if we take into account the role of the federal estate
tax as a device to moderate the concentration of family wealth-
its primary function in the eyes of some theorists; an important
secondary function for an even larger group32-an unlimited ex-
emption for charitable bequests is not only consistent with this
role, but actually makes an affirmative contribution to its achieve-
ment. 3 By encouraging testators to make charitable bequests, the
deduction helps to disperse wealth among a larger group. Indeed,
it may outperform the tax itself in this respect, since some testa-
tors-as argued above-may reduce their transfers to family mem-
bers in order to make deductible bequests to charitable institu-
tions. Conversely, if part of the charitable bequest became non-
deductible, testators might well prefer, as suggested, to leave more
of their property to members of their families, thus increasing,
rather than diminishing, the concentration of wealth.
IV. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
I should now like to turn from the fundamental policy issues to
some technical problems that would be introduced into the areas
of tax law and estate planning by the enactment of a percentage
limitation on the deduction of charitable bequests. For sim-
plicity, I will assume that the prescribed limit is 50 per cent-
the same as the income tax limitation.
.. Charitable bequest formula clauses? Faced by a percentage
limit on the deductibility of charitable bequests, some testators
will wish to insure that the federal estate tax attributable to the
nondeductible portion does not diminish their other bequests.
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This can be done, of course, by including a tax-apportionment
clause in the will or by allowing an applicable state tax-appor-
tionment law to take effect.34 Other testators, however, will want
to avoid nondeductibility entirely, preferring to transmit the
otherwise nondeductible amount to members of the family. If
they want to take full advantage of the deduction without ex-
ceeding it, the obvious solution will be a charitable bequest
formula clause, comparable to the marital deduction formula
clauses now used to achieve a similar result.
It is surely unnecessary to stress, before this group, the estate
planning complications that would arise from adding another
type of formula clause to the lawyer's tool kit. Quite aside from
these complexities, it would be deplorable to increase the num-
ber of wills that the testator must accept on faith because he can-
not be expected to understand what his lawyer has drafted. More-
over, while testators may be willing to accept marital deduction
formula clauses on being told that the plan is "good for the fam-
ily," a testator who confronts a similarly complex formula when
a charity is the beneficiary may feel that the complexity smacks
of tax avoidance or worse, or presages a field day for the lawyers
after his death, and he may then react by cutting back sharply on
the bequest itself.
2. Charitable gifts in contemplation of death. In applying the
proposed percentage limitation on the deduction of charitable
bequests, the Code would presumably take into account charita-
ble gifts made in contemplation of death during the last three
years of the decedent's life. Although existing law does not ex-
clude charitable gifts from the contemplation of death provision,
the issue does not ordinarily arise because inclusion of a charita-
ble gift would simply increase the estate's deduction by the same
amount, so the net result would be a wash. 35 Under the proposed
change, however, an unusually large charitable gift could become
part of the gross estate because made in contemplation of death
but, because of the percentage limit, not be offset by an equally
large deduction. This risk would increase the use of charitable
bequest formula clauses by foresighted draftsmen as a way to keep
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the aggregate charitable transfers, during life and at death, at or
below the percentage qualifying for deduction.3 6
3. Carryover of "excess" charitable bequests. The income tax
provision limiting the deduction of charitable contributions,
which, as I have said, has inspired the proposed estate tax limit,
permits an "excess" contribution to be carried forward for use
as a deduction in later years if the taxpayer's gifts fall below the
deductible limit.3 7 A similar carryforward of a disallowed chari-
table bequest for federal estate tax purposes might be feasible in
the case of married couples. If the first spouse to die exceeded
the limit and also left a bequest to the survivor, the survivor's
estate could be allowed to deduct the excess amount, up to its
percentage limit. On the other hand, if the first decedent did not
fully use the allowance, the estate of the surviving spouse might
be allowed to use the balance, at least against property inherited
from the first decedent. Such a carryforward of either an excess
deduction or an unused percentage allowance could rest on the
theory that each spouse should be treated as owning one-half of
the family fortune and as making one-half of their joint charita-
ble bequests, regardless of the actual division of the funds and
bequests between them. I cannot envision, however, any other
situation in which a carryforward would be warranted or feasible.
4. Percentage limit in federal gift tax? A final question, which
I list as a technical issue though it has important policy ramifica-
tions, is whether the proposed percentage limitation on the estate
tax deduction for charitable bequests is to be accompanied by a
parallel limit on the deduction of lifetime gifts in computing the
federal gift tax. In general, of course, the gift tax was enacted and
has been treated as a buttress to the federal estate tax, rather than
as an independent tax with significant objectives of its own.
Though Congress has not yet been willing to integrate them, the
intimate relationship between the two taxes is evidenced by the
adoption of the gift tax's split-gift provision and marital deduc-
tion in 1948, when the estate tax's marital deduction was enacted,
as well as by their parallel treatment of community property from
1942 to 1948. If a limit on the deduction of charitable bequests
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is enacted, can a limit on the deduction of charitable gifts be far
behind?
Without a gift tax limit as a buttress, the percentage limit on
charitable bequests could be avoided by lifetime gifts, unless the
donor died within three years and the gifts were thrown into the
estate because made in contemplation of death. But a gift tax
limit would in turn place great stress on the timing of all lifetime
transfers, since a large charitable contribution could be sheltered
by large gifts to members of the family in the same year, though
it would be taxable if it was made in one year and the family
gifts in another.3"
To mitigate the rigors of annual (indeed, quarterly) account-
ing for gifts, a carryforward might be allowed, with a donor who
exceeded the limit in one year being allowed a deduction for any
later year (or a refund of the prior year's tax) in which his charita-
ble gifts were less than half of his aggregate gifts. Conversely,
much could be said for permitting unused allowances to be car-
ried forward from year to year to be used whenever charitable
gifts exceeded the allowance that would be permissible for a par-
ticular year, rather than to apply the limit year-by-year as though
each year were unconnected with the prior period.
Finally, if the long-overdue integration of the federal transfer
tax system were achieved, it would imply a correlative integra-
tion of the percentage limitation, under which it would be im-
material whether charitable contributions were made during the
taxpayer's lifetime or at death. This would require a cumulative
computation of all transfers (save for de minimis amounts and
exemptions, if any, granted to encourage early gifts), with the
percentage limitation becoming effective if-but only if-the
aggregate charitable gifts during life and at death exceeded the
applicable percent of all transfers. If there had been a temporary
excess resulting in a transfer tax during the taxpayer's life (e.g.,
a charitable gift in the first relevant year exceeding that year's
percentage limit), the resulting tax would be treated as a down
payment on the amounts due for later years and eventually at
death (and refunded if necessary) if the charitable gifts were be-
low the limit when cumulated over the taxpayer's lifetime.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion: The last few years have been a difficult period
for charitable institutions; social needs have increased; contribu-
tions have suffered from the recession; and the legislative climate,
especially as respects taxes, has been chilly. Unquestionably there
were abuses that cried out for Congressional remedies, but just
as certainly there have been remedies that went too far.39 I have
discussed only a small corner of this troubled area, but my
principal point-that the burden of death taxes falls not on the
decedent, but on the persons and institutions who survive the
decedent-has much wider ramifications and, though simple, is
often overlooked. Any proposed change in the tax treatment of
charities should, in my opinion, be preceded by an analysis of the
ultimate burden of the change. It may then become apparent that
the added tax will fall on persons least able to bear it-the bene-
ficiaries of charitable institutions. The limit on the deductibility
of charitable bequests is only one of a number of legislative pro-
posals that take on a different complexion when this point is
recognized.
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